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Since World War II, U.S. commercial banks
have experienced a dramatic shift in asset com-
position, from an aggregate portfolio consisting
largely of reserves and U.S. Treasury securities
to one consisting largely of loans to the private
sector. Since 1960, banks have come to rely
increasingly on purchased money-market
funds varying their purchases by adjusting the
rates paid on these funds ("liability manage-
ment")-while simultaneously allowing their
capital cushions to decline. These developments
have made banks more sensitive to financial-
market fluctuations and have made theirliquidi-
ty depend importantly on their ability to pur-
chase funds.
This paper examines changes in bank assets
and liabilities since World War II, relates these
changes to a rise in bank exposure to real and
financial-market fluctuations, and uses this his-
torical perspective to draw relevant implications
for regulatory policy. The relative decline of
liquid risk-free assets, the increase in purchased
short-term liabilities, the diminished capital
cushions, and the increased sensitivity of bank
equity prices to stock-market fluctuations all
provide evidence of increased bank exposure to
financial-market fluctuations. Because of the
increased risk exposure and because of the in-
creased bank reliance on purchased funds as a
major source of liquidity, bank regulators must
weigh carefully the potentially perverse effects
that liability-management restrictions (such as
rate ceilings) can have on the banking sector's
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liquidity and stability. Since 1973 regulators
have not used constraints on liability-
management instruments as a means oftighten-
ing policy. The analysis of this paper supports
this direction in policy because sudden regulato-
ry constraints on purchased funds can cause a
liquidity crisis within the U.S. commercial-
bankingindustry. Furthermore,such constraints
may not be a necessary part ofmonetary policy.
Increased exposure to financial-market risk
does not necessarily implythata bank'stotalrisk
has risen. Ifthe economy, financial markets, and
regulatory policy have become more stable (less
risky), then total bank risk might have declined
even in the face ofincreasing risk sensitivity. Itis
generally accepted that perceived total risk in the
economy and in financial markets declined over
much of the postwar period through the late
1960s, and then increased in the 1970s. 1 Until
recently, bankers may not have perceived any
significant increase in the total risk of their
portfolios. But recentdevelopments, particularly
since 1973, may well have changed this percep-
tion.
The first section of this paper discusses the
theoretical linkages between assets and liabilities
in the framework that considers the trade-off
between expected return and risk. The second
section examines postwar trends in bank assets
and liabilities, along withtrends inthe sensitivity
of bank equity prices to the stock market. The
third section analyzes the impact of changes in
the structure ofbank assets and liabilities on the
cyclical sensitivity of banks, while the final
section presents the policy implications.I. Theoretical linkages Between Bank
Assets and liabilities
Liability management and changes in bank-
asset composition are necessarily related. How-
ever, the relationships are complex and are
affected by factors external to banking-such as
general economic activity, net credit demands,
changing perceptions of and attitudes toward
risk, and regulatory constraints. Despite these
complications, portfolio theory as applied to
financial institutions suggests certain broad rela-
tionships between asset and liability structures.
If commercial banks operate in competitive
financial markets, then there are important im-
plications for bank portfolios.2 The spread (i.e.,
rate differential) between the rate earned on
assets and the rate paid on liabilities must be a
measure of the value of the service that banks
provide. Several aspects ofthis service aredirect-
ly relevant to the relationship between bank
assets and liabilities. Among other functions,
banks invest funds and make loans. In perform-
ing this function, banks gather information,
forecast, and screen borrowers, and for this
receive a positive spread. Inaddition, banks pool
and at times absorb risk by placingdepositfunds
across a spectrum of types and maturities of
loans and investments, and also absorb risk by
maintaining a capital cushion. (Thus, there is
risk diversification across instruments at a point
in time, and risk diversification overtime suchas
a business cycle.) To the extent that banks (or
theirstockholders)take on risk, thereshould be a
compensating expected return.3 The importance
of risk and the manifestation of risk diversifica-
tion in bank portfolios are central to a study of
changes in banking assets and liabilities.
liability Managementas a Sourceof Growth
Liability management has two principal moti-
vations; it can be used both to control bank
growth and to purchase liquidity. Both of these
aspects imply theoretical relationships among
liability management, bank assets, and bank
risk.
Liability management is aneffective meansfor
a bank tocontrolits rate ofgrowth. Putsimply, a
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bank can accelerate its growth if it is willing to
pay more for purchased funds than other banks
do. However, a distinction must be made be-
tween the growth ofa single bankand the growth
of the entire banking system. As banks seek to
accelerate their rates ofgrowth, they will have to
borrow additional funds from outside the bank-
ing sector. These funds may come from either of
two sources: (1) an expanding level of total
financial activity in the economy, or (2) an
increase in the banking sector's share of total
financial activity. The latter aspect-"bank in-
termediation," or simply "intermediation"4-is
the more relevant measure in the context ofthis
paper, which focuses on the banking sector's
share of total borrowing and lending in the U.S.
economy.
An individual bank can increase its share of
bank intermediation by raising its rate on pur-
chased funds marginally above that of its com-
petitors, but when other banks follow this strate-
gy, the effect will be to raise the market rate for
purchased funds (relative to open-market rates)
and to increase bankintermediation.Ifbankstry
to ensure faster growthby biddingup the ratefor
purchased funds (relative to other rates), they
will have to seek earning assets with higher
expected returns, and thereby maintain a posi-
tive spread that compensates for transaction
costs and risk. Thus, as banks increasingly use
liability management to gain a larger share of
total financial market activity, they will pay
relatively more for their purchased funds, and
will face the increasingly difficult task ofachiev-
ing a high enough spread to offset the cost
involved. In a competitive market, this process
will likely force banks to seek earning assets that
entail higher risk and/or less liquidity.
liability Management as a
Source of Liquidity
Liability management not onlyenablesa bank
to control its growth rate, but also enables it to
exert greater control over the variability of its
total liabilities-for example, by increasing pur-
chased funds to offset a loss ofdemanddeposits.To the extent that a bank expects to reduce such
variability through liability management, it will
expect acommensurate reduction in the variabil-
ity oftotal bank credit. Thus, it canextend credit
that entails greater transaction costs, greater
short-term price variation, and!or less
liquidity-the type of credit that financial mar-
ket theory tells us should provide a higher ex-
pected yield. Therefore, an increase in liabilities
for which banks can freely vary the deposit rate
(and thus the quantity obtained) should be
associated with higher-yield bank credit. In this
respect, liability management provides a substi-
tute for holding reserves, U.S. Treasury securi-
ties, or other low-yield short-term liquid assets.
That is, liquidity on the liability side ofa bank's
portfolio (through, say, day-to-day trading in
certificates of deposit or Federal funds) is a
substitutefor liquidityontheasset side (through,
say, day-to-day trading in Treasury securities).
Although purchased funds may substitute for
liquid assets, the two sources of liquidity are not
perfect substitutes. First, holding liquid assetsto
meetfuture liquidity needs will normally result in
different returns and risk than will holding
illiquid assets withtheanticipation ofpurchasing
liquidity when needed in the future. Consider
two banks, one that holds liquid (low yield)
assets against demand deposits on the presump-
tion that these assets will provide for future
liquidity needs, and another that holds illiquid
(high yield) assets on the presumption that, if
necessary, it will later purchase funds to meet a
future run-off in demand deposits. The compar-
ative profitability of the two strategies will
depend upon the ensuing financial environment.
Ifthere is no run-offin demand deposits and no
liquidity squeeze, the strategy ofholding illiquid
assets will prove more profitable. However, if
demand deposits run offand marketrates simul-
taneously rise, the strategy of holding liquid
assets may be more profitable.
Purchased funds and liquid assets are imper-
fect substitutes for another reason as weI!. Regu-
latory restrictions on liability management-
such as Regulation Q ceilings on certificates of
deposit or increased reserve requirements on
Eurodollar purchases-may effectively limit
these funds as a source of liquidity to the
commercial-banking sector. To the extent that
banks rely on purchased funds ratherthan liquid
investments as the primary source of liquidity,
such restrictions can lead to a severe liquidity
squeeze, as in 1966 and 1969-70. Although simi-
lar restrictions have not been used in the last few
years, bankers cannot be certain that they will
not be employed in the future. A possibility of
regulatory restrictions---assuming they cannot
effectively be avoided-may render liability
management a poor substitute for liquid assets.
Implications for Aggregate Bank Portfolios
Both motivations of liability management-
growth and liquidity5-suggest that an increase
in the use of liability management should be
associated with an increase in asset risk and!ora
decrease in asset liquidity. Thus, asset composi-
tion may change in several ways, such as a
decrease in marketability, increase in market-
related or total risk, or increase in time to
maturity. However, there is no reason that such
changes should be motivated solely bychangesin
liability management. In fact, major changes in
asset composition became well established prior
to thechangesin liability management. Thus, the
two trends should be viewed as interrelated
changes in bank portfolio management.
II. Postwar Secular Trends in Assets and liabilities
Over the 1946-60 span, bank liabilities in-
creased rather slowly (Chart I). The average
annual growth rate, 3.7 percent per year, fell
considerably below the 6.5-percent average in-
crease in nominal GNP and the very rapid 10.5-
percent growth rate for deposits at thrift institu-
tions (savings and' loan associations, mutual
savings banks, and credit unions). Throughout
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this span, the commercial banking sector relied
principally on traditional demand and time
deposits as sources of funds. Neither source
expanded rapidly-2.5 percent annually for de-
mand deposits and 5.6 percent annually for time
deposits. Banks normally held their rates on
individual time accounts below boththeRegula-
tion Q ceiling and S&L deposit rates. In addi-Ratio Scale
Chart 1
(Year-End Outstandings. 1946-75)







* Commercial bank credit market instruments outstanding as a share of total
nonfinancial credit market debt.
Source: Flow~of-funds accounts
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rapid thrift-institution growth through the ex-
tension of Regulation Q to thrift-institution
deposits in 1966.
Despite sharp declines during the 1966 and
1969 credit crunches and the 1970 recession,
bank liabilities grew very rapidly from 1961
through mid-1974as a whole. Thisperiodexperi-
enced relatively rapid economic growth and a
strong rise in private-both consumer and
business-spending and debt. But in addition,
the banking sector's intermediary role increased
significantly, reversing the earlier decline. As
shown in Chart 2, bank intermediation declined
from over 31 percent in 1946 to 26 percent in
1960, but then rose to 32 percent by the end of
1974 before declining somewhat again.
Secular Shifts in Bank-Asset Composition'
The composition of bank assets has changed
dramatically over the postwar span. Non-
earning assets, vault cash and member-bank
reserves, have risenata sluggish pace, principally
because (1) a slow increase in demand deposits
has led to a net reduction in the effective
required-reserve ratio and (2) more effective
reserve management, motivated by rising inter-
est rates, has reduced aggregate excess reserves.
Thus, earning assets have risen from about 85
percent of bank assets in 1945-48 to about 90
percent in 1972-75.
Ofgreaterconsequence, however, has beenthe
pronounced postwar shift in the composition of
earning assets. Marketable U.S. Treasurysecuri-
ties declined from an average of 63 percent of
aggregate bank credit outstandingin the 1945-48
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tion, many banks did not accept corporate time
accounts.
Throughout the 1950s, most banks accepted
slow growth either as sound banking practice or
as something largely beyond their control.
Monetary policy, regulatoryconstraints, andthe
memories of the turbulent 1930s all probably
contributed to this conservative posture. How-
ever, as mOl~ey-market rates rose in the 1950s,
corporations began to shift their funds out of
banks (particularly New York banks) and into
money-market instruments. To compete effec-
tivelyforcorporatedeposits and toacquirefunds
for lending, New York banks began in February
1961 to issue negotiable certificates of deposit
(CD's), other city banks then followed, and
security dealers began making a secondary mar-
ket for these instruments.
Chart I shows the pronounced acceleration in
the growth ofbankliabilities after 1960. Overthe
1960-75 span, bank liabilities increased at a 9.1-
percent average rate (compared with average
growth rates00.6percentfor nominalGNPand
10.1 percent for thrift-institution deposits).
Banks arrested theirearlierrelativedecline large-
ly through the success of their innovations in
liability management, such as large negotiable
CD's, Federal funds transactions,6 and borrow-
ings from foreign branches (Eurodollars). Other
contributing factors included favorable mone-
tary and regulatory policies, which until the late
1960s did little to inhibit thegrowthofpurchased
funds, and the reduction in the hitherto very
* Growth rates are annual compound rates between initial and terminal vearS.
Liabilities are net of commercial bank interbank deposits and Federal" fund
purchases.
Source: Flow-of-funds accounts
15period to an average of 10 percent in the 1972-75
period. Other governments-state, local and
Federal agency-increased their share of bank
credit outstanding from 5 to 19 percent overthe
same time span, and in particular, the loanshare
of the total jumped from 29 to 70 percent.
Banks entered the postwar era with what in
retrospect can be considered abnormally high
liquidity. At the end of 1945, U.S. Treasury
securities constituted 73 percent of bank credit
outstanding. Thus, banks were able to accom-
modate a substantial increase in loandemand by
liquidating Treasuries, reducing their holdings
from $91 billion in 1945 to $61 billion in 1960.
Since 1960, the Treasuryshare ofbankcredit has
continued to decline from 30 percent to only 10
percent in 1972-75. This period also marked the
spread ofliability management, and with minor
exceptions (until late 1974) was characterized by
heavy demand for private credit. In this environ-
ment banks were willing, if not anxious, to
accommodate a rising market for bank loans by
purchasing funds and simultaneously reducing
their cushion of liquid secondary reserves (and
capital accounts). Bankers may have been con-
sciously taking additional risk with the expecta-
tion ofgreater reward. Butin addition, inviewof
the apparent decline in perceived market risk in
U.S. financial markets, bankers may notactually
have been aware of any substantial rise in their
total risk. In any case, bank asset structures
became increasingly susceptible to financial-
market fluctuations, despitethe fact thatliability
managementalso provided (in theory) a bufferto
offset asset illiquidity.
Contrasted to the declining share of U.S.
Treasury securities was the growing postwar
importance of Federal agency and state-local
government issues. Treasury and agency issues
may be considered substitutesfor each other, but
the latter carry some additional default risk and
may be of longer maturity. Municipal securities
may carry substantial default risk and vary
widely in maturity. Thus, the shift in security
holdings from U.S. Treasury to Federal agency
and state-local government securities should be
viewed as a shift away from liquid low-risk
assetsJ
Secular Trends in Liabilities and
Capital Positioning
Postwar developments in liability manage-
ment and capital structure are reflected in a
change in the composition of aggregate bank
liabilities, as shown in Table2. (Large-bankdata
show more striking changes in liabilities, as they
do for assets, buttheemphasishere is onthe total
commercial-banking sector.) During the 1950s,
bank liabilities consisted of equity capital and
Table 1
Secular Changes in the Composition of
Bank Credit Outstanding
Percentage of Total Loans and Investments, 1952-75
loans' Investments
Real To Indi- U.S. S.&l.
Total C&I Estate viduals Other Total Treas. Gov't. Other'
1952-553 46.3 18.8 11.7 9.7 6.2 53.6 42.6 7.6 2.6
1956-59 54.6 22.1 13.7 11.6 7.2 45.4 34.2 8.4 2.1
1960-63 59.1 21.0 14.6 13.2 10.2 40.9 28.6 10.0 1.8
1964-67 65.4 23.6 16.3 14.8 10.8 34.5 19.2 13.0 2.4
1968-71 67.3 25.2 16.6 15.1 10.4 32.7 13.9 15.3 3.5
1972-75 70.0 24.8 18.0 15.0 12.3 30.0 9.8 14.9 5.4
1 Equals"otherloans" in Federal Reserve Bulletin, i.e., excludes Federal funds sold and securities purchased underagreements
to resell.
2 Consists mostly of securities issued by Federal agencies.
3 Averages of semi-annual call data over each four-year period.
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin,assets of all commercial banks.
16"traditional" sources offunds-net demand de-
posits, time deposits other than large CDs, and
small amounts of Federal Reserve float and
borrowing from Federal Reserve banks. Equity
capital increased as a portion of total liabilities
during the 1950s. But since 1960, purchased
funds have risen from zero to 12 percent of the
overall portfolio, while traditional sources of
funds and capital (particularly equity capital)
have declined as a share of the total.
Because of data limitations, Table 2 under-
states the growing importance of liability man-
agement. First, it includes among "traditional"
sources the rapidly-growing category of time
deposits other than large CDs, although the
distinction between the time deposits and large
CD .categories has become increasingly fuzzy,
particularly since Regulation Qceilings no long-
er apply to some time-deposit categories. In
addition, the table includes only partofthe rapid
increase of purchased funds transacted through
holding companies, and excludes certain "off-
balance sheet" items such as arbitrage transac-
tions through agencies of foreign banks.
Despite data limitations, the figures in Table2
show both a rapid increase in the importance of
purchased funds and a decline in the equity (and
total capital) base since 1960. When viewed as a
source of liquidity, the increase in purchased
funds from zero to 12 percent ofthe portfolio is
very important. Likewise, when viewed in terms
of leverage, the small decline in equity from 9.1
to 7.5 percentoftotalliabilities is also important.
This change represents an increase in the lever-
age ratio (total liabilities/equity capital) from
11.0 to 13.3. If measured relative to "risky as-
sets," leverage has of course shown an even
greater increase. (Again, the change has been
greater for large banks than for others.) Thus,
between 1960 and late 1974, we have witnessed
two striking secular trends-an increase in pur-
chased funds and a decline in banks' capital
cushion-alongwith the decline in asset market-
ability mentioned earlier.
Although the compositional shift from liquid
assets to illiquid assets (Table 1) was well estab-
lished prior to the advent of liability manage-
ment (Table 2), the developments were closely
related. On the asset side, rising interest rates,
high private demand for bank loans, small Fed-
eral deficits, and a gradualwaningofDepression
fears led banks to reduce noninterest-bearing
reserves and shift funds from liquid investments
to (high yield) loans. On the liability side, rising
interest rates (combined with RegQceilings) and
a favorable economic environment provided the
incentive for banks to move more aggressively
into financial markets by purchasingmore funds
Table 2
Secular Changes in the Composition of Commercial Bank Liabilities1
Percentages of Total liabilities, 1952-75
Traditional Sources Purchased Funds Capital
Demand Time, Excl. Large Federal
Totaf2 Dep.,Net Large CDs Total" CDs' Funds, Netli.! Eurodollars Total Equity Debt Misc. -----
1952-556 89.3 62.4 26.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 8.0 8.0 0.0 2.4
1956-59 88.0 57.7 29.5 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 8.7 8.7 0.0 3.2
1960-63 85.5 51.0 33.6 2.3 1.9 0.0 0.4 9.1 9.1 0.0 3.2
1964-67 82.0 42.4 38.9 5.7 4.6 0.4 0.7 8.8 8.4 0.4 3.4
1968-71 79.0 37.2 41.0 7.3 4.8 1.0 1.4 8.5 8.0 0.5 5.2
1972-75 73.8 30.9 42.4 12.2 9.3 2.1 0.4 8.1 7.5 0.6 5.9
I Liabilities are net of interbank demand deposits and interbank Federal funds purchases.
2 Includes borrowing from Federal Reserve banks and Federal Reserve float, not shown separately.
3 Includes loans sold to holding companies, loans from foreign banking agencies, and time accounts at foreign banking
agencies, not shown separately.
• Negotiable CDs over $100,000.
5 Consists of security RP's and float on commercial bank interbank loans.
6 Averages of year-end outstandings.
Sources: Flow of funds accounts for all items except equity capital which is from Federal Reserve Bulletin.
17for bank lending. Furthermore, banks utilized
purchased funds to provide some ofthe balance-
sheet flexibility lost through the compositional
shift in assets.
Stock Market Evidence of Bank Risk
These interrelated developments-the decline
in asset liquidity, the growth ofliabilitymanage-
ment, and the decline in bank capital--suggest
that U.S. banks have become more exposed to
risk, particularly the risk associated with general
economic and financial conditions.
There is a way to test this proposition. Finan-
cial theory makes wide use ofthe "market mod-
el" and the concept of"beta."8 Using the market
model, returns of an individual security (or
group of securities) are regressed against the
returns in the overall stock market to determine
the extent to which the individual security (or
group of securities) is sensitive to overall stock-
market fluctuations. (The model is shown in the
notes to Table 3.) The stock market is represent-
ed by a broad index such as the Standard and
Poor's Composite of 500 stocks (S&P 500). The
resulting beta value is a measure ofthe sensitivity
of the return of the individual security to the
return in the market. Forexample, if a stock has
a beta of0.5 (perhaps a utility stock), we should
expect on average far a IO-percent change in the
level of the stock market to result in a 5-percent
change in this stock's price. In contrast, if the
beta is 1.5 (an airline stock), the same market
return would result in a 15-percent change in the
stock's price on average. (By definition the aver-
age stock's beta is 1.0.)
It is well known thatthe stock marketis highly
influenced by expectations regarding thegeneral
economic and financial environment. If banks
are insulatedfrom thisenvironment, bankstocks
should not be very sensitive to factors that affect
the overall stock market and bank stocks should
have a low beta. Estimated betas for Standard
and Poor's stock index of nine New Yark City
and sixteen large banks outside New York City
show that this was indeed the case for the post-
war period through the 1950s (Table 3). How-
ever, since about 1960 these bank-stock indexes
have become substantially more sensitive to
fluctuations in the overall stock market (S&P
500). Since the stock market generaily reflects
anticipated business and financial conditions,
these data suggest that common stocks of large
Table 3
Betas of Standard and Poor's Bank-Stock
Indexes Against the S&P 500.11




R'2 Beta 01 Beta Beta 01 Beta
1947-49 .39 .10 .31 .56 .16 .25
1950-52 .36 .12 .18 .47 .13 .26
1953-55 .37 .12 .19 .35 .12 .18
1956-58 .37 .11 .22 .50 .10 Al
1959-61 .63 .17 .28 .49 .12 .31
1962-64 .98 .11 .69 1.06 .09 .81
1965-67 .89 .23 .28 .74 .18 .32
1968-70 1.11 .17 .53 1.09 .14 .63
1971-73 .68 .19 .25 .78 .14 .47
1974-762 1.09 .18 .52 1.22 .18 .59
I Based on rates of change in last-Wednesday-of-the-month prices after 1952 and monthly-average prices for preceding
periods. The regression model is:
In(P banks, t+ 1 !P banks, t) =a + b IniP 500, t+ 1 ! P 500,t) + e
2 Data tor 1976 are through August.
Source: Standard and Poor's price indexes for 9 NYC banks. 16 banks outside NYC and composite of 500 stocks.
18banks have become more sensitive to the eco-
nomic and financial climate in the past several
decades.
The·betas of these bank-stock indexes rose
primarily between the late 1950s and early 1960s
and have since fluctuated around the higher
level. The R-squared values also rose during
these intervals of rising beta, indicating a closer
association between changes in these stockseries
and changes in the overall stock market and
indicating that a greater percentage oftheirtotal
price fluctations is nowmarket-related.Theshift
between the 1950s and 1960s occurred as large
banks aggressively moved into the money mar-
kets to purchase funds, extended their loan
commitments rapidly, and allowed their equity
leverage to rise.
Chari 3
III. Liability Management and the Cyclical Stability of Banking
Some evidence is provided by the pattern of
bank intermediation-the share of total
nonJ?inancial-sector borrowing provided in the
form ofcommercial-bank credit (Chart3). (The
measure in Chart 3 is based on flows and is thus
more sensitive to cyclical variation than is the
measure based on stocks in Chart 2.) The move-
ment of quarterly data reveals two important
characteristics. First, there is a good deal of
variability throughout the entire period. Analy-
sis of the two underlying series that form the
ratio shown in Chart 3 shows that both the flow
of bank credit and the flow oftotal funds raised
by nonfinancial sectors vary considerably and
are highly correlated, but that the flow of bank
An important question raised by the develop-
ments discussed above is whether the liquidity
provided by liability-management (purchased)
funds can compensate for the decline in asset
marketability experienced overthe postwarperi-
od. If banks can stabilize the short-term varia-
tion in total liabilities (by varying the rate paid
on purchased funds), then liability management
can reduce the risk inherent in declining asset
marketability. If purchased funds have actually
served this function, then we shouldexpecttosee
a reduction over time in the short-termvariation
of total bank liabilities, and therefore greater
cyclical stability in bank credit. Is there any
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* Quarterly flows of commercial bank credit market instruments as a share of total funds raised by nonfinancial sectors including new equity issues.
Sources: Actual data from flow-of-funds accounts. Dating of periods from Poole for periods of monetary deceleration, NBER for recessions, and Friedman for
periods when CD rate exceeded ceiling ratc.
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within the period (Table 4 and Chart 3). Later,
during the 1966 and 1969 periods, when liability
management was constrained by effective RegQ
ceilings, disintermediation was severe despite
attempts by banks to circumvent restrictions. In
sharp contrast, during the one recent period of
monetary restraint in which liability manage-
ment was not constrained (1973:4-1974:3), bank
intermediation was exceedingly high (38 percent,
compared with the 1972-75 average of 32 per-
cent). Inthis lastperiod, bankintermediationdid
not decline significantly until the onslaught of
the "inventory" recession in late 1974. Thus,
there is strong evidence that unconstrained lia-
bility management can enable banksto maintain
intermediation during periods of monetary de-
celeration.
credit is by far the more volatile series. Thus, the
flow ofbankcreditis moresensitiveto changes in
economic and monetary conditions than is total
borrowing in the economy, anc-l_larger relative
changes in the flow ofbank credit are the princi-
pal cause ofvariations in the extent ofintermedi-
ation.
The second characteristic is the shift in the
pattern ofquarterly deviations after 1961. Quar-
terly stability was practically nonexistent prior
to that year. In contrast, the period since 1961 is
marked by spans ofrelative stability interrupted
by a few intervals of extreme instability. This
change in the patternofstability may be attribut-
ed in part to liability management, or it may be
the result ofchanges in economicconditions and
in monetary policy, including effects of Reg Q.
Because of the influence of monetary and
economic conditions on bank intermediation, it
is necessary to examine liability management
and the stability of bank credit in a framework
that recognizes broad changes in these external
factors. Specifically, we may ask whether liabili-
ty management has enabled the banking sector
to stabilize the degree of bank intermediation
during periods of"tight money." Althoughthere
is no commonly accepted method of defining
tight money periods,two criteria providea rough
approximation: (I) a deceleration in the growth
rate of money (M I) preceding business cycle
peaks,9 and (2) the existence of binding ceiling
rates onCDs, with secondary-market rates rising
above the allowed ceiling rate on new CDs.
According to these criteria, there have been six
tight-money periods since 1952, separable into
three different categories: (1) pre-liability man-
agement (i.e., prior to 1961), (2) liability man-
agement with constraints (the 1966:3-1966:410
and 1969:2-I969:4 periods), and (3) liability
management without constraints (the 1973:4-
1974:3 period). The latter distinction arises be-
cause, in the last several years, monetary policy
makers have ceased using such constraints as
ceilings on large CDs and high reserve require-
ments against Eurodollar deposits. 11
During two of the three pre-liability-
management periods of monetary restraint, dis-
intermediation was substantial, while during the
other it was modest-although highly variable
20Definitions:






























"Average percentage changes at quarterly rates in seasonally
adjusted quarterly outstandings.
Total Bank Credit: Total bank credit (net of interbank
deposits and Federal funds transactions).
Loans: Sum of mortgages. consumer credit, bank loans,
n.e.c., and security credit.
Investments: Total bank credit minus loans as defined
above.
Total Liabilities: Total liabilities (net of interbank deposits
and Federal funds purchases).
Traditional Sources: Sum of net demand deposits, time
deposits other than large negotiable CDs, borrowing from
Federal Reserve banks, and Federal Reserve float.
Other Liabilities: Total liabilities minus traditional sources
as defined above.
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts.
Pre-liab. Mngt. Post-liability Management
Pre-liability Mngt. Post-liabilitv Mngt.
1952:1-1960:4 1961:1-1976:3
Average Quarterly Rates of Change in Major
Commercial Bank Assets and Liabilities*
banks no longer had much flexibility for liqui-
dating investments, sinceTreasurysecuritiesand
other investments had already been reduced to
















This evidence can be supported by a more
detailed examination of changes in major bank
assets and liabilities (Table 5). In this analysis,
bank credit is divided into loans and invest-
ments, and liabilities into traditionalsources(net
demand deposits, time deposits other than large
CDs, borrowing from Federal Reserve banks,
and Federal Reserve float) and other liabilities
(principally purchased funds and capital).
If purchased funds are to stabilize total bank
credit in periods of monetary restraint, their
growthrates should increase (or not decrease as
much as those of traditional sources). Actually,
"other liabilities" increased rapidly during the
pre-liability management periods of monetary
restraint, at a 3.3-percent average quarterly rate
of increase. Although perplexing at first glance,
this has a straightforward explanation, since the
increase was almost entirely in equity capital
(which includes retained earnings) and bank
profits were high in these periods. Loan growth
was not unduly restrained during these periods,
because funds were available from other liabili-
ties (particularly equity capital) and from net
liquidation of investments.
In contrast, severe bank disintermediation
occurred during the 1966 and 1969 periods of
constrained liability management. For these
periods on average, traditional sources grew
slowly, 0.6 percent quarterly, compared with a
1.9-percent average for the 1961: 1-1976:3 span.
The growth rate of other liabilities (0.8 percent)
was also low-especially low compared with a
4.6-percent average for 1961: 1-1976:3. Conse-
quently, during the 1966 and 1969 tight-money
periods, controls on purchased funds reduced
the increase in these funds far below normal, so
that loan growth was severely restricted despite
the liquidity provided by net saies of invest-
ments.
The 1973:4-1974:3 period ofmonetarydeceler-
ation, in which Regulation Q ceilings were effec-
tively removed, shows an entirely different pat-
tern. Bank growth was rapid over this period.
Other liabilities increased at a whopping 7.0-
percent quarterly average rate, while loan
growth averaged 3.2 percent quarterly. In addi-
tion, there seemed to be little need to liquidate
investments to meet loan demand, since pur-
chased funds fulfilled this function. (Of course,
21Incontrast with the overall 1961-74 period, total
bank credit and total liabilities have increased
slowly. Loans have been nearly flat, but invest-
ments (especially marketable Treasury issues)
have increased markedly. Deposits (excluding
large CDs) have accelerated, while other liabili-
Recent Reversal in Liability Management
The rapid increase in purchased funds and
expansion of bank loans to mid-1974 ultimately
proved destabilizing to the banksector, given the
(unforeseen) recession in late 1974. But there is
no reason that unconstrained liability manage-
ment must always result in increased risk. The
expansion following the inventory recession of
1974:4-1975: I has been one in which earlier
trends in liability management have been re-
versed and bank portfolios have become less
risky, as seen in the following table. (The figures















ties have actually declined because ofa marked
drop in the amount of purchased funds.
Three questions immediately come to mind.
Are we reverting back to a 1950-style pattern of
bank portfolios and capital structures? Is the
recent reversal attributable largely to forces
external to banking (i.e., regulatory, economic
or financial changes) or rather to a concerted
effort on the part of bankers to reduce the risk
exposure oftheir portfolios? Is the shift a precur-
sor of future banking trends or is it merely
transitory?
Answers to these questions extend beyond the
boundaries of this paper, but some response is
merited. First, despite the significance of these
developments, casual analysis suggests that the
recent conservative trend has not moved major
liquidity and capital ratios back beyond where
they were in theearly 1970s. The second question
has stirred considerable controversy,12 but no
final answers can be reached until we assess the
relative importance of the factors-regulation,
economic trends, and bank portfolio
management-that have been instrumental in
the recent reversal in trend. The same considera-
tions will determine the answer to the third
question-the permanency of this recent shift in
bank behavior.
IV. Conclusions-Policy Implications
This paper has attempted to show that the
liquidity and stability ofU.S. commercial banks
have become more sensitive to economic and
financial-market risk over the postwar span.
This trend has resulted primarilyfrom changes in
bank portfolio management, on both the asset
and liability sides.
The marked reduction in liquidity of bank
assets over the postwar period has implications
both for liability management and for monetary
policy. Declining liquidity has been reflected in
the shift in assets away from noninterest-bearing
reserves and secondary reserves (U.S. Treasury
securities). Although this trend has been partly
offset by increased purchases ofU.S. agencyand
state-local government securities, the most im-
portant development has beenthe sharpincrease
in loans to the private sector. Clearly, this com-
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positional shift in assets has reduced asset mar-
ketability on balance.
Bank growth accelerated rapidly after the
advent of liability management in 1961, and
subsequently (until late 1974) banks relied in-
creasingly on purchased funds for both growth
and liquidity. With purchased funds available,
banks had anadditional incentiveto reduce asset
liquidity. Banks-particularly large banks-
presumably considered holdingadditionalliquid
assets to be a costly alternative to purchasing
liquidity. Thus, the compositional shift in bank
assets and theexpansionofliability management
can be seen to be closely interrelated.
Trends in bank asset and liability management
cannot be appraised independently of the eco-
nomic environment in which they occur. Bank
portfolios are structured within a frameworkthat depends largely upon expectations of ri~k
and return. Although this paper ha~ not ex-
amined postwar trends in total economic and
financial. risk, it is readilyapparerttthat the
banking sector's exposure (sensitivity) to such
riskhasrisen.The rela.tivedecline of"riskfree"
assets·(reserves.and short-term Treasuryissues),
the relative decline of"interest insensitive" (tra-
ditionai) deposits, the diminishing capitalcush-
ion ofbanks, andthe rise ofbank-stock betas all
provide evidence· of increased exposure to
financial-market developments.
These considerations together have important
implications formonetarypolicy. Stringent(that
is, truly restrictive) limitations on purchased
funds could create a severe liquidity squeeze
within the U.S. commercial banking system.
This is related to the fact that there is no large
secondary market outside the commercial bank
sector for loans as there is for securities. While
there is a wide market for Treasury bills, most
loans would be very difficult for a bank to sell in
a liquidity squeeze. In this situation, the banking
sector as a whole-and not simply individual
large banks-has come to rely on liability man-
agement as its principal source of liquidity.
Given this fact, it is not surprising that banks
devised ingenious instrumentsto circumventCD
ceilings during the 1966 and 1969 tight-money
periods. Despite these efforts, bank disinterme-
diation was heavy during those periods. Al-
though it is difficult to assess the effects of
liability-management curbs on total financial
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flows and total spending in the economy, the
effect on the. banking system was obviously dis-
ruptive.
Banks have purchased funds notonlytostabi-
lizethe variance of bank credit. during tight-
money periods,butalso to accelerate their
growth during expansionary •periods, In this
respect, liability management has increasedthe
banking sector's exposure to economic fluctua-
tions. Duringthe 1971-74 period,banksincreas-
ingly purchased funds to meet loan commit-
ments, but. in the process allowed their capital
cushions and liquid investments to decline in
relative terms. These measures presumably
would have promised high returns in a stable
economic environment, but they also served to
make the banking system more vulnerable in the
sharp recession at the end of 1974.
Policy-makers henceforth will be forced to
weigh carefully any perverse effects on the
commercial-banking system resultingfrom poli-
cies that attempt to restrict the flexibility of
liability management. Actually, it is not clear
that monetary policy needs to resort to such
tactics, or even that restrictions of this type
effectively curb economic spending. The 1973-74
tight-money period occurred without any resort
to direct controls over liability management.
This period of monetary deceleration mayor
may not have brought on the ensuing inventory
recession, butthe recession occurred withoutany
prior curbs on liability management or severe
disintermediation of bank funds.FOOTNOTES
1. See the paper by Herbert Runyon in this issue. Additional
evidence from varied sources supports this view. The PIE ratio
in the stock market roseconsiderably in the late 1950;'and early
1960s, and ignoring fluctuations of short duration, did not fall
dramatically until 1973. In addition, monthly variation in stock
market (S&P 500) returns generally declined through the late
1960s and then rose during the 1970s. Studies cite a number of
possible explanations for a postwar decline in the market's
perception of risk. William Nordhaus, "The Falling Share of
Profits," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (No.1, 1975),
pp. 198-204: Henry Wallich, "Framework for Financial Resilien-
cy," Conference on Financial Crises, New York University, May
21,1976: and Stuart I. Greenbaum, "Economic Instability and
Commercial Banking," Hearings of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Congress (October
31 and December 1 and 8, 1975).
2. Many commercial banks operate in markets that are not
highly competitive, largely because of regulations that often
restrict entry of new banks or prohibit branch banking. Meas-
ured by dollarvolume, however, mosttransactions take place in
competitive markets, as a result of the sheer dollar volume of
transactions at large city banks and the system of correspon-
dent banking.
3. Financial theory suggests that (given diversified portfolios)
the pertinent risk to be considered is market-related and not
firm-specific, from the standpoint of either bank portfolios or
loan differentials. Small banks do not hold diversified loan
portfolios, in part because loans are concentrated in the local
geographical area-and their risk is thus partly firm-specific-
but the most importantproblem forthe commercial banksector
as a whole is market-related risk.
4. The term "intermediation" is used throughout to mean the
commercial banking sector's share of financial-marketactivity.
Two closely related measures are used-one based on banks'
share of total financial market flows (lending and borrowing)
and one based on banks' share of stocks (total assets or
liabilities) in the financial markets.
5. This paper ignores a third reason for liability management:
legal avoidance ofreserve requirements. New instruments have
normally been subject to reserve requirements only with some
time lag.
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6. Banks had traded Federal funds among themselves in
earlier years, but had purchased only insignificant amounts
from outside the commercial banking sector until the mid-
1960s.
7. There are additional reasons for the rapid increase in bank
holdingsofstate-localgovernmentobligations. Forone reason,
there was probably much less perceived risk on municipal
issues than there had been during the Depression of the 1930s.
Banks bought such issues also because oftheirstrong ties with
local governments, or because of legal restrictions requiring
the pledging of government issues against deposits. Finally,
banks purchased municipals because they gained a compara-
tive advantage from the tax-exempt status of such issues,
although this factor is now declining in importance because
other means are available of obtaining credits against taxable
income.
8. The market model and beta are described in recent text-
books on finance and investments. A short description is also
contained in Franco Modigliani and Gerald Pogue, "An Intro-
duction to Risk and Return," Financial Analysts Journal,
March/April and May/June 1974.
9. William Poole, "The Relationship of Monetary Decelera-
tions to Business Cycle Peaks," Journal of Finance (June 1975).
The Poole study ended prior to the recent recession, so some
judgment had to be madeaboutthis period. Although the NBER
dates the recent business-cycle peak within the fourth quarter
of 1973, the sharp "inventory recession" did nottake effect until
late 1974. This study concentrates on the inventory recession
that occurred over the 1974:4-1975:1 period, because inventory
purchases and short-term credit demands remained strong
until thistime. Using Poole'scriterion and this recession dating,
monetary deceleration "prior to a business-cycle peak" oc-
curred over the 1973:4-1974:3 period.
10. The period of effective CD ceilings in late 1966 coincided
with a deceleration in the growth of money. However, since an
NBER recession did not follow, the period did not meet Poole's
criterion.
11. For exact restrictions and dates of removal, see tables in
any issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
12. See the contributions of Gilbert, Harris, and Kaufman
listed in the bibliography.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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